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SCHOOL DISTRICT
OF PHILADELPHIA
1.

Federal/Civil~ ~ ~~~ ~

~~

SUWu\RY:

.e.t:J ~~ ~/E:J..,. ~~adR female high schoo student ~ ·

Petr is

1

.

who sought admission to Philadelphia's all male high school; ~
she was denied admission solely on the basis of her

~;-~at

s~

Petr claims this violated the Equal Protection Clause and the
Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974.
2.

FACTS:

....,.~-·

The facts as found by the district court

4

.

- 2 -

Philadelphia maintains two types of senior high schools
for college bound students:

comprehensive and academic.

The only two schools in the academic category, Philadelphia
High School for Girls (female only) and Central High School
(male only), have been segregated by sex since their founding in the nineteenth century.

Girls and Central are the

only two schools which draw their student bodies from the
entire city.

Admission is granted upon application of a

student who meets certain academic requirements (tests and
grades); only 7% of the students in the Philadelphia school
district meet the admission standards.

The admissions

standards for both schools are comparable.

The courses of-

fered at Girls are similar and of equal quality to those
offered at Centralo

Since its founding in 1848 as a school

to train teachers, Girls has become "the equal of Central in
preparing its students for college."

With one exception, the

academic facilities of the two schools are comparable.

"In

general, it can be concluded that the education available to
the female students at Girls is comparable to that available
to the males at Central."

Graduates of both schools have been

and are accepted by the best and the most prestigious colleges.
The schools differ in the following respects:

(1) Central

has better scientific facilities; (2) Central has earned and
maintained a unique reputation for academic excellence and for
training men who will become local and national leaders in all
fields of endeavor; although Girls has a large number of

l
f

l
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(
graduates who have achieved similar prominence; (3) because
of its academic standing and reputation, Central has attracted the attention (and speeches) of national leaders
throughout the school's history; (4) Central has a dedicated,
loyal, and distinguished alumni who are involved in matters
pertaining to the school and who have established a substantial
private endowment for the school.

There is no evidence that as

a result of this endowment Central's facilities, faculty, or
course of instruction is superior to Girls.
Both Central and Girls offer their students a more
intensive intellectual experience and better preparation for
college than is offered by any of the nonacademic high schools.
Admission to a comprehensive high school is normally based on
a student's residence.

Three of the comprehensive high schools

are sexually segregated (2 male, 1 female).
In 1974, while in the ninth grade, petr applied for
admission to Central; she met the academic qualifications but
was rejected solely on the basis of her sex.

Her parents

brought this § 1983 action on her behalf and on behalf of the
class of similarly situated females.

She chose not to apply for

admission to Girls and enrolled in a comprehensive coeducational
high school in her neighborhood.

Her motivation and grades have

declined, in part because of her perception that her teachers
expect and demand less than was expected at her academic, coed,
junior high school.

After trial, the DC ordered that petr and

her class not be denied admission on the basis of sex; CA 3 did

- 4 (
not stay this order as to petr.
to attend Central.

Nevertheless, petr declined

7

Since the trial petr has qualified for

early admission to college after the eleventh grade and, according to resps, citing a Philadelphia newspaper, petr will
enter college this fall.
At trial, the studies of two expert witnesses were
considered by the DC.

The Tidball study concluded generally

that women from coed colleges were not as career successful as
women from all female colleges.

The Jones study examined at-

titudes of New Zealand secondary students toward their school,
schoolwork, extracurricular activities, and the approval of
their parents and peerso

The study concluded generally that

boys and girls at single sex schools in New Zealand held
attitudes associated with stronger academic motivation than
boys and girls at coed schools.

Tidball is a woman, Jones is a

man.
Resps' goals relevant to academic high schools are
(1) increasing efficiency and basic skills of students,
(2) providing an extensive network of early childhood programming, and (3) providing educational options to students and
parents.
3.

DECISIONS BELOW:

The DC (Newcomer, E.D. Pa.)

concluded that the substantial equality of the education at
the two schools and the lack of evidence that exclusion of women
from Central had generated a sense of inferiority in the women
students took the case out of the realm of Brown.

Nevertheless,

- 5 -

(

the court found that female students were unconstitutionally
denied the opportunity to attend a coeducational, academically

1/

superior, public high school. -

"Having identified this

classification [men and women] as adversely affecting women,"
the court found that it was not justified by a fair and substantial relationship to the resps legitimate goals.

The

court acknowledged that under a mere rational relationship
test the classification would be constitutional.
On appeal, CA 3

~

sponte raised the issue of the

application of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of
1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-21 (relevant sections attached to this
memo).

It then examined the legislative histories of a 1972

act pertaining to federally funded educational programs,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86, a prior formulation of the EEOA that was

2/

not enacted, and the EEOA. -

Based on this analysis, the

1/
The DC also seemed to find some harm in the frustration of
petr's desire to attend Central, "a desire which, in light of
Central's history and reputation, does not seem frivolous or
eccentric." Opinion, Petn., at 82a-83a.

2/

CA 3's analysis is somewhat confusing and hardly a model of
statutory interpretation. It first noted that the 1972 legislation, prohibiting sexual discrimination in federally funded
schools, did not apply to the admission policies of secondary
schools, despite the House version of the bill, which covered all
primary and secondary schools. It then observed that the 1972
version of the EEOA originally contained no reference to sexual
discrimination, that references were added in committee, that
some of these references were omitted without explanation, that
the bill was defeated, and that the EEOA 'tvas passed in 1974.
Applying this history to the ambiguities of the statute, CA 3
concludes that "Congress spoke clearly enough on single-sex schools
in 1972 when it chose to defer action in order to secure the data
needed for an intelligent judgment." Opinion, Petn., at lla.
The dissenter's complaint that CA 3 has found silence in 1972 to
speak louder than words in 1974 is not wholly frivolous.

- 6 (

court concluded that the Act does not require that every
school be coeducational.
On the constitutional claim, CA 3 distinguished this
Court's sex discrimination cases on the ground that every
case striking down a sex classification involved an inadequacy of female rights in relation to male rights.

The

court found that petr was not deprived of an opportunity for
equal education, since any benefits or detriments inherent in
the single sex academic high schools falls on both sexes
equally.

Whether or not the theory underlying separation of

the sexes into equal schools is conclusive, it is based on
equal,-h!:,ne,!it,

~

discriminatory denial.

CA 3 concluded that

under either standard of review, the single sex school policy

3/

was constitutional. -

l

Judge Gibbons dissented on both the statutory and
constitutional claims.

Disagreeing with the majority's reading

of the legislative history and the provisions of the EEOA, he
argued that Congress had, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as construed in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641

(1966), found that single sex schools violate the equal protection clause and had therefore prohibited them.

On the

In support of its conclusion, CA 3 cited Williams v. McNair,

316 F. Supp. 134 (D. S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).

There the DC refused to find an equal protection violation when
two institutions in an eight school system were single sex (one
male, one female). Plaintiffs were males seeking entry into the
female school. This Court affirmed without opinion.

- 7 constitutional issue, the dissenter argued that the
majority had impermissibly resurrected the "separate but

l

equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537.
felt that Brown prohibited that result.

He

Judge Gibbons

concluded that the exclusion of females from Central did
not bear a fair and substantial relationship to the resps'
legitimate goals.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the two schools

are not equal because Central's superior science facilities
and the "intangibles" noted supra.

She also claims that

Central's refusal to admit girls "carr[ies] a clear message
[ t h at ] f ema 1 es [ are ] memb ers o f t h e ' secon d sex, '" .!:. o ~·, t h e
Brown inferiority complex.

She then contends that resps have

not shown a fair and substantial relationship between the unequal treatment and the resps' goals.

On the statutory issue,

petr contends that the EEOA prohibits separation of the sexes
in the only two academic high schools and that it declares such
separation to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Resps agree with CA 3 on the constitutional and statutory
issues and further contend that the case is moot because petr
is going to college in the fall and the DC did not properly
certify the case as a class action.

They claim that the improper

certification results from the DC's failure "as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action

o

••

[to] determine by

order" that the case is properly brought as a class action.
(Rule 23(c)(l)).

They also cite the DC's failure to make express

- 8 -

findings that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites were satisfied.
5.

DISCUSSION:

The DC's conclusions of law, dated

the same day as the judgment and order, include the following:
"This suit is a. proper class action
under Federal Rule 23(b){2). Plaintiff
is therefore c~tj fied pursuant to that
subsection as the representative of all
those females, who otherwise meet the
admission standards of Central High
School, who have been, are, or will be
denied admission to Central because of
their sex."
Resps cite no authority to support their contention that this
does not satisfy the Rule 23 requirements.

Even if this is

adequate certification, however, a mootness problem remains.

-tt~ ~

\

.

In Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975),

' ,A.,~.~~

this Court held that when a named plaintiff drops out of an

v\> .....~--~

c..tk..-~~

<A

~~
J~J ~_7
. u s L ~1. '-('JlG
·

· r/

V3r.; ~ -

'• .....

action the case is moot unless it was duly certified as a class
action, a controversy still exists between members of the class
I

J-r and the opposition, and the issue is such that it is capable of

- ..___ __ _ _ _ - ~~:"'~ repetition yet evading review.
Id., at 129 (emphasis added).
-:~

~ ~~
""'()..

..ll

~

v

Assuming that Susan Vorchheimer, the named plaintiff, has dropped
out (because she decline~ to attend Central when permitted by

~ ~ court order and she is going to college in the fall) , the case

J~~·
~~.._,

:;::::;t;i .

is moot under the third Jacobs requirement.

Students may apply

to academic high schools as early as January in the ninth grade;
thus, a plaintiff would have three years to pursue her action.
This t-7ould not seem to evade review.
On the merits, the case raises some interesting but not
clearly certworthy issues.

The initial problem is the factual

~~a
- 9 question of whether the two schools are equal.

As to

educational opportunity, the £C's findings clearly establish
~ guality.

Neither the DC, CA 3, nor the appellate dissenter

bought petr's argument that the other differences between
the two schools are of constitutional significance.
courts seem correct.

Those

Petr does not suggest that this Court

should adopt the DC's version of the inequality:

that females

are denied an opportunity to attend a coeducational academic
high school.

Petr's silence on this point is understandable,

since both male and female students are denied that opportunity.
Petr has not claimed anything other than a gender based discrimination •
The Court may wish to take cert to decide the Brown

'No

issue of is-sexually-separate-inherently-unequal in the conte~t
of high school education.

The DC, however, found that there

was no evidence before it to support that claim.

Petrs have

provided this Court with no support for the assertion that
women at all-female institutions perceive themselves as inferior.

J The only sociological studies considered at trial support the
opposite conclusion.
Absent any inequality, the question of whi.ch is the
appropriate standard need not be decided.

Resp has classified

its students by gender, but there is no significant difference
of treatment between the two classes.
The statutory issue may be certworthy simply to clarify
I

\

a very ambiguous piece of legislation.

Congress' finding on

/

- 10 equal protection pertains to . the "maintenance of dual
school systems in which students are assigned to schools
so ley on the bas is of • • • sex • • • "
(emphasis added).
of its schools are.

20 U.s .c. § 1702

Resps' system is not so maintained, some
Under Part 2 of the Act, entitled "Un-

lawful Practices," Congress prohibits deliberate segregation
of students among or within schools by race, color, etc., but
not by sex.

§

1703(a).

Yet subsection (c) of the same sec-

tion prohibits assignment of a student to a school other than
the closest appropriate (grade level and type) one, if the
assignment results in a greater degree of sex seg-regation.
Unless "assignment" is construed not to include the voluntary
application procedure of Girls and Central, resps are in
violation of this section, at least as to those girls who live
closer to Central than Girls.

Moreover, those female students

living closer to Girls are possibly being "assigned" to the
closest appropriate for the purpose of segregating students on
the basis of sex in violation of § 1705.

All these violations

despite resps' apparent compliance with the congressional policy
of § 1701 of providing equal educational opportunity without
regard to sex.

Perhaps the statute should be remanded to

Congress.
There is a response.
9/2/76

ME

Kujovich

DC & CA Opinions
in Petition

§ 1701.

Congr~~lorutl rleclurntlon of policy
(a) The Congress declares lt to be the policy or the United States that-

( 1) llll children enrolled In public schonls are entitled to equal
educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and
( 2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining
public school assignments.
(b) In order to carr:;- out thi!< policy, It Is the purpose of this subchapter to !!pecify appropriate remedies for the orderly removal or the vestiges
or the dual school system.

§ 1702. Cong-t·essional findings; necessity fo1· Congr·css to specif)· nppropri:lte reme~li<•s for elimination or dual school sysh·ms without affectIng judicial enforcement of fifth ntHl fourteenth nrnendments
I a) The Congress find s that( 1) the maintenance of dual school systems in which students
are assigned to schools solely on th e basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment;

(
I

'

§ 1703. Deninl of equal educational opporttmi ty prohibited
Xo State shall d en y equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her r a ce, color, sex , or national origin, by( a) the d eliberate s egregation by an educational agency of s t udents
on the basis of race, color, or national O!·igio a.mong or within
schools;

(c) t!1e assignment by an educational agency of a student to a
school, other than th e one closest to his or her place of re:sidence
within the school district in which he or she resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation of stu(~ents on the
basis of ru ~e . color, sex. or n?tional origin among th e scho ols of
such agency than woulcl result if such (;tudeut w e re assigr.ed to th~
achool closest to his or her place of residenc e within the school district of such agency pro\·iding th e appropriate grade level and type
or education for such stud e nt;

(e) the transfer by an educat.ion,tl agency, · \vhether voluntary or
otherwise, or a student from on e school tc another if the purpose and
effect of such transfer is to increase segregation of stud('nts on the
basis of race, color, or national origin among the schools of such
agency; or

.•

t:j 1'70:). .<\sl!lg-runt'nt on nt'lghhor·lu)()() h11sls not n denlul of E'<}Uul edu·
CHlional opportunity

Subject to the other provisions of this subchapter, the a!ls!gnment by
an educational agency of a student to the school nearest his vlace of residence which vro\·ictes the approvriate grade le1·e1 and type of education
for such student Is not a denial of equal educational opportunity or or
equal protection or the laws unless such assignment is for the purpose
or segregating students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin,
or the school to which such student Is assigned was located on lts site for
the purpose of segregating students on such basis.

§ 1706. Civil actions by indh·idunlll denied t>qunJ educational opportunities or by Attorney General
An Individual denied an equal educational opportunity, as defined by
this subchapter may institute a cl\·il action in an appropriate district
court of the United Stn.tes against such parties, and for such relief, as
may be appropriate.
·

§ 1720. Definitions
For the purposes of this subchapter-

(c) The term "segregation·· means the operation of a school system
In which students are wholly or substantially separated among the schools
of an educational agency on the basis or race, color, sex, or natiqnal origin
or within a school on the basis of race, color, or national origin.
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Vot ed on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted .. . ...... . ... . .. , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No. 76-37

SUSAN LYNN VORCHHEIMER, BY HER PARENTS BERT AND CAROL
VORCHHEIMER, ETC., Petitioner
vs.

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, ET AL.

7/12/76 - Cert.

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'l'
N

POST

DIS

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

ABSENT

D

I

~~e.~e·I~s·,. ~·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. . ·. ·. ·. ·. ·.. ·./. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. :

::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .

Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.,/,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. . ......... .

Blackrnun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,/,,........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .
Marshall, J ............ .

.1. ............. .

White, J .. ... . . . ....... .

·····~··············· · ·············

Stewart, J..............

. ............... .

Brennan, J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.I ............. .

Burger. Ch. J . .. . .. . . .... ... ..... . ..

f . ...... .

NOT VOTING

(}ourt ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

00

•

00

00

00

00

00

00

•

19

,

00

•

--'

4

"

I" I U

No. 76-37

VORCHHEIMER
vs.

SCHOOL DIST. OF PHILADELPHIA

RELIST for J. White

HOLD
FOR

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'l'

CERT.
G

N

D

POST

DIS

MERITS

AFF

REV

MOTION

AFF·

G

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

D

Stevens, J . .. ... . . .. .. ... ...... / . ... ·/ ·.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-1.

.. . .. .. .. . . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. . . .. . ......... .

Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.../
ji . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .

Blackmun, J .................. . /

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .

Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ; · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .
White, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... :.;· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

............. ............ ........ ...................

.

11 .............

Brennan, J .................. . . ~
Burger. C::h. J ..

00

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. ................. .

V' ..... .

00

00..

............ ........
..

•

..

..

..

•

..

•

..

..

•

..

. ................. .
..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

..

February 21, 1977
BENCH MEMO
To: Mr. Justice Powell
From:

Dave Martin
No. 76-37,

Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia

This is a difficult and close case, but I believe the
petitioner has the better of it.

I think

th~ollowing rationale

is the best of many axaiiaaxxaaa available for deciding the
case: Central and Girls are sufficiently siffi£Hik different,
to the disadvantage of
wixkxxka/females,aaiwgxsixasxawxagas; to call for justification
under the standard of Craig v. Boren.

The state's interest

in fostering maximum educational attainment and a suitably
serious attitude toward eduational pursuits is undeniably
i~m

important, but the evidence does not show a substantial

relationahip w between these goals and sex-segregated academic
high schools.

This would be a constitutional holding and

would not rest on the Equal Educational

'

Opportunit~es

Act of

1974b(e€o~).
And now for the details

Mootness.

. . . .

The suit is moot as to the named petitioner.

But the DC certified a class action and specified the class
that petr represents, Pet. App. at 55a (Conclusion 3).

Resp

argues that this is inadequate, since the DC did not make
sryecific findings or conelusions with respect to all the factors
listed in Rule 23(a).

Resp is right about the lack of specifics

as to those factors, but I disagree with resp's conclusion.
~~a

Board of School,Cornrnissioners v. Jacobs, 420

u.s.

128,

-2-

found inadequate certification for failure to describe the
members of the class.

It went no further.

That requirement

is met here, and I do not think it makes sense to expand Jacobs.
xaxam»xa«a

It would have been better for the court to specify

its findings under Rule 23(a)--and thabpinwn here could so
for mootness
/'
state--but dismissal/is a harsh sanction to visit upon petr's
class for the failings of the judge, especially when there seem1
to be no dispute that the 23(a) requimmenffi are in fact satisfied.

The federal statutes.

Resp's policy of sex segregation

for the two academic high schools does not violate Title IX,see
20 U.S.C. § 168l(a)(1).
§

v~olates

Whether it

1701, et seq., is a mH«k tougher

questi~n,

the EEOA, 20 U.S.C.
since the Act

is not well drafted and since it carries contradictory indicatioas
as to congressional intent regarding sex six«ximiRaxiaR segreI

gation.
policy

But there is a tougher question yet.
violat~

If Philadelphia's

the Act but would not be found to violate

the Equal Protectiqn Clause standing alone, was the Act a valid
exercise of Congress's powaw under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

That throws us right i~to the troublesome doctrine
'-'

announced in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, and modified (?)
in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112.

In other words, in thisfA~~~

case>deciding on statutory grounds would not enable the Court
to avoid constitutional questions.
an additional one.

We

~uld

In fact, it simply adds

still have to determine what the

Equal Protection clause standing aiaRgx alone would require-in order to know if Congress has gone further.
the Morgan inquiry.

And then comes

•'

-3-

In this cureous setting, it seems appropriate to decide
the Equal Protection question first.

The SG seems to urge

this, suggesting that we should consider the EE6A as primarily
concerned with remedies and not intended to go beyond the
unadorned
AEqual Protection clause in its statement of substantive law.

Se~G's

brief at 18.

In case this course proves impossible or undesirable, I
offer my tentative views on the statute.

Most of the statute

seems clearly intended to ban segregation or discrimination
based on the categories usually proscribed:
origin, and sex.

~t

§

race, color, national

-

1703La) does not mention sex:

No state shall deny equal educational opportunity
to an individual on account of his or her race, color,
sex, or national sxigiaR origin, by-(a) the deliberate segregation by an educational
agency of students on the basis of race, color, or
national origin among or within schools.
Nebertheless subsection (c) goes on to condemn assignments
among schools, if the assignment results in greater segregation
by sex (unless it is an assignement to the nearest schoml).
Then

~

1705 forbids assignment even to the nearest school if

--

it is for the purpose of segregation on the basis of, inter alia,
sex.
The

le~isla~ive

untangling this mess.

history apparently gives no help in
No solution is completely satisfactory,

but I think the SG does the best job, brief at 20.
that

~

He suggests

1703 be read as permitting sex segregation within schools

(so as to permit separate gym classes, locker areas, etc.), but
not overcoming the other sections with respect to sex segregation
among schools.

There is support for this notion in § 1720(c),

not cited by the court of appeals.

-4If this is a valid interpretation, then resp's policy
violates either § 1703(c) or § 1705.

Resp xixa tries to avoid

this result by saying it has not assigned anyone to either
Central or Girls; all admissions are based on voluntary applications.

I don't buy this.

Once a student qualifies for

an academic high school and chooses to go that route, he or
she is assigned to one school or the other based solely on
sex.
Finally, if this is the construction, I think gaRgxaax
the statuee is probably valid under Morgan.

But I have always

found that case one of the most troublesome in constitutional
law, and I would want to review the literature it has generated
before taking a final stance on this question.

The Equal Protection clause.

Both courts below noted some

differences between . . . Girls and Central, but both concluded
that they were "substantially equal."

If substantial equality

is sufficient, and if there is no independent

reason~to

apply

Craig v. Boren scrutiny simply because a gender classification
is employed, then there really is not an Equal Protection
question presented.

This is essentially resp's position.

I(

,,

In my view, Craig
v. Boren scrutiny applies.
<

First, and

less important, the crucial language from Craig is this:
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." (slip at 7).

Other cases also imply

that mere classification is enough to merit scrutiny.
think it can be denied that there is

I don't

at least a classification

-5-

by geneer operative here.
More importantly, I do not think there is "substantial
e_gualitf1" hereff'l'. Or--perhaps to say the same thing in different
language--xke one must be more sensitive to differences that
do exist when a sex classification is employed in the realm
of education.

.

See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; Brown v.

Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483.
A.
~lJ£Q~ &R

T~ngible factors.

~

I think~ both courts fa£H&~x

when they concluded that there was substantial

equality, were focusing on tangible factors like quality of
facilities and student-faculty ratios.

They alax also looked

to the fact that graduates of both schools are readily accepted
by highly regarded colleges.
important.

~Hkx

These factors are certainly

But there is one tangible factor with respect to

wh~h Central excels:

science facilities.

I cannot understand

why neither court below xkax thought this difference was
"substantial."

Certainly if I were a female interested in

pursuing a science career, I would regard these differences
as quite substantial--even though I might acknowledge that to
they
most students ix/would make no difference.
B. Intangible factors.
hard-nosed lot.

Ordinarily we lawyers are a

Intangible factors don't count for much if

tangible factors point

~

strongly a to a certain conclusion.

But in xkixxaxeaxxx the realm of constitutional law involved here,
there is highly respected precedent emphasizing the importance
segregation3
of intangibles: Sweatt and Brow~. Both involved racial/aix£ximiimmediately
RaxiaR~ and cerminly one does notjreact to sex segregation in
the same fashion.

Bt!f! as ! havE

r'eRseFes ~

eus FQ&eeien pat~?'it:>-

-6-

Since sex segregation doesn't have quite the same invidious
"feel," it seems that intangibles assume correspondingly
lower importance.
But as I have pondered my own reaction pattern, I have
come to wonder whether my reactions are not the product of
long-standing practice and "old notions" (see Stanton v.

421 U.S. 7) that simply cause intangibles to seem

~ntan,

less important to me viewing the situation through male eyes.
I wonder whether many would not have had a somewhat similar

feeling about race segregation xkxiXJ thtrty years ago.

My

point is certainly not that sex segregation is as invidious
as race discrimination--for many purposes one must treat the
multiple
two quite differently, as the/"tiers" of this court's traditional
analysis bear witness.

~~~deserve

t

My point is that the intangible factors

as careful attention here as they did in the

- -

earlier cases.
The intangibles are these: history and prestige of Central
~----------------------

c~~
re
. swl-k
~ _

(Philadelphia,of course, can't do much about these at this

the~

point), books in tre library, the endowment fund and
; o ff ere d . None of these is very important in itself, but in

'"' ·~
;;~~ c~ulative effec~

they cannot help but carry a message:

*

fi~h
~.~... .J;iS not the best/school
in Philadelphia; Central is.
~ t•r.o~.
•

a

0 ~ ().ec.f)'i'L's

;..... ~···~s

s symptomatic.

----

Girls

The diploma

By statute, only Central is authorized to grant

omething called a Bachelor of Arts degree, while Girls, like

-

-

~ ~--) other schools,simply awards a diploma.
s~ 'J

111>1

The eife£xx«X tangible

effect of the two is the same.

One cannot enter law school on

the strength of a Central B.A.

But the symbolism is clearly

there.

*

I

~ ~ of'~ J;~~ ...vt.....r-c:. Gc'.,-ls i..1

~.e.rr ~ ~v~.

r

I hope I am not overstating the differences. In any
substantial
event, I do conclude that they are/enough to RHk~e£x say that
the schools are not equal--meaning the assignment policy must
be tested under Craig v. Boren. The state's aim purposes
good
·
are clearly important: fostering/academic iRxixaRmeRX attitudeS

-

and improving achliYement.

And the Jones

study~ited

in the

lower court apinions shows that there is some relation between
toward academic pursuits
sex segregation and attitudes/(although it said nothing about

achievemen~.

But I do not think the demonstrated relation is

even as substantial as the relation shown in Craig.

Moreover,

if Philadelphia really believes that sex segregation makes
a substantial contribution to learning, then it is hard to

HBR understand why it has not decreed sex segregation for
all its high schools.
If the Court follows the outline~ reasoning in holding

-

for petr, then it would not be saying that all schools must
be coeducational.

It would simply be saying that a school

system
that chooses single-sex schools must be scrupulous in
....
a~uring

equality.

I think that avoiding the broader separate-

but-equal question is desirable in iteelf, although I do acknowledge
~

that a aei£ decision~ as I have

outlined~

may make it quite

hard for public school systems, as a practical matter, to sustain

...,...

--

single-sex schools .

T~

~The

,,right,, to

coedua£ion.

I see nothing in this cliim.

Here

the most lenient '~ational basis~ standard applies, and I think resp
has met that.
Remand.

The SG suggests a remand, essentially for further

*"I ~~.,..k. ~T,·J.io~ ~~ ~~~-

v..o ~"o.t~ ~~ ~·

-8-

inquiry into the tangible effects of the intangible differences .
I have summarized above.

I think that wuld be a mistake.

~F~j--~t.,,

1rhe SG seems to suggest that the DC should be required to figure
out the economic impact (in connection with career opportunities)
that would obtain if a woman went to RR«xxal Central instead
of gjxlx Girls.
done.

I am not sure that can be meaningfully

More importantly, it seems we know enough now to decide.

In saying this, I emphasize that I do not think the course
I have sketched above amounts to this eourt refinding the
facts.

It amounts to reassessing the legal significance

of undisputed facts.

On this basis, I xa«lsxxaxa recommend reversal.
D.M.
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CHAMB E RS OP'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 9, 1977

Re:

76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District of
Philadelphia

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In today's special Conference, the vote on the merits
remained as it was at the March 4 Conference.
I therefore propose that notwithstanding Bill Rehnquist's
"disclaimer," we defer consideration until his current
views are known. In my view, action by an equally
divided Court would be open to valid criticism as an
institutional failure to meet our obligations.
However, should that be the ultimate result, I will
write my view on why the absence of one Justice should
lead to reargument.
Obviously, we did not take this case to evaluate findings
against the record but only to decide whether gender
separatedequal schools are "inherently unequal," and
that issue should neither be evaded nor delayed.

l

J

I t
ll

~uprmtt

C!Jcurt ttf tqt 'Jllnittb ~httttt

Jfattqi:ttgtttn. ~. <!J. 2llg!J!.'
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 9, 1977

Re:

/

76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District of
Philadelphia

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In today's special Conference, the vote on the merits
remained as it was at the March 4 Conference.
I therefore propose that notwithstanding Bill Rehnquist's
"disclaimer," we defer consideration until his current
views are known. In my view, action by an equally
divided Court would be open to valid criticism as an
institutional failure to meet our obligations.
However, should that be the ultimate result, I will
write my view on why the absence of one Justice should
lead . to reargument.
viously, we did not take this case to evaluate findings
ainst the record but only to decide whether gender
paratedequal schools are "inherently unequal," and
at issue should neither be evaded nor delayed.

{rwt '-i ~
a:.u.~~

Regards,

l
l
t

I

<qcurt cf ±4t'J!tnittb ~tatttt
'Jl!TnttJringhm. ~. <q. 2ll.?Jl.~

~uttrtntt

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

'" April 11, 1977

Re:

76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I am - not sure I have a clear picture on the motion
for reargument.
In the posture that the case stands now, it seems to
me that there would be ge6uine institutional "negatives"
in having it reaffirmed by an equally divided Court even
though I agree with the results reached by that process.
It is one thing to affirm a case of significance
with an equally divided Court when there is nothing we
can do about it (as in the 1969 Term with only eight
Justices), but it is quite another to follow that course
when it will merely require one hour of additional time
at the final oral argument session, at which time Bill
Rehnquist will be able to participate.
I have ;~ uneasy feeling that the DeFunis case will
be linked with this -- erroneously, of course; but it may
appear even to some thoughtful people that the Court had
evaded the issue at a time when the addition of one hour
to the argument session would produce a definitive result.
We should act on this promptly because the parties
should be notified very quickly if it is to be set for reargument in the second week of
final session.

'l.

April 18,

':!i.

·~,·,

No. 76-37

1:.
n·',

""

r.r, r.

of

Dear
As I view the case as involving unique facts, I am
content to "let the chips" lie where they fell.
~

·Your Per Curiam has my approval·•.

~1''

The Chief Justice "
lfp/ss •

,,

x~wni·,,j·,i '.

.f, .,..!

cc:

The Conference

.$)u:prtut.e <qcu:rt ttf tqt 'J!ittitth ~~

2]l!rattfringhm, :!9. <q. 2ll.;t.l!$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

April 18, 1977

Re:

No. 76-37

-

Vorchheimer v. School District
of Philadelphia

Dear Chief:
As at conference, my vote is to reargue. I feel the
Court will look bad, or at least awkward, if, under the circumstances that attend this case, we affirm by an equally
divided vote.
Sincerely,

fl. u. 6.
The Chief Justice

cc:

The Conference

d.v- 9

~~~-.;#

~~~~

" ~ ~~ 4J
~''jh

:.&.:1- ~

'?~~

Uu-~-~~c. ~~

~·

fl
f

(!J{tlttf .of Ur~ ~u~ .§fattg
',$aglyi:ttgftm, ~. <!J. 21!gi'!$

.§uputttt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 18, 1977

Re:

76-37 - Vorchheirner v. School Dist. of
Philadelphia

Dear Chief:
My vote is not to reargue.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.§uprcmt Qfllltti 11f fJr.c ~tifd~ ~wtts
Jnas-Jringtcn, ~. tq:.

20.?.1!-~

CHAMB E RS Of

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

April 18, 1977

RE: No. 76-37 Vorchheimer v. School District Philadelphia

Dear Chief:
I agree with the Per Curiam you have prepared in the
above.
Sincerely,
/

Ace~

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

,.

tI

I

J

.§u:punu <!Jllltrlltf tirr 'J!lnitt~ .§btt£5
~all~ gl. <!J. 2!lbi~~
CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE POTTER ST E WART

April 18, 1977 -

Re: No. 76-37 - Vorchheimer v.
School District of Philadelphia et al.
Dear Chief,
The Per Curiam you have circulated
today seems correct to me.
Sincerely yours,

t? ~ .
I •

/
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

ot tqt ~t~ ,jmtte
',Waelfittghm. !}. ~· 2Llbi'l-.;l

~ltJlTtttu ~4lttrt

CHAMBERS O F"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 18, 1977

Re:

No. 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. Philadelphia

Dear Chief:
Although I thought the case should be
argued, the per curiam you have circulated seems
to reflect the Conference vote.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

l
1

-

.iu:vumt <!fourt of tqt ~tti:ttb .itatte
~aeqhtgton. ~. ~· 2!1~'1-~
CHAMBERS Of"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

Apr il 1 8, 197 7

76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District
of Philadelphia

Dear Harry:
Your memo of today re the above is what I tried
and failed to get five votes for last Friday. We
will look "bad" and the four who voted to reargue
need not waive the ancient right to say "What did
we tell you"!
However, until the Court gives me two votes as
in ancient English law when a court is equally
divided, I find it difficult to cope with four
unr e g e nerate, unreconstructed "rebels"! In which
case I conduct as orderly a retreat as possible!

Regards,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

~nvunu {!fonrl ltf

.tlr.t ~ub- ~hrl.t.a'

:Jla;;r~ttm. ~.

<If.

20.;1~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 19, 1977

Re:

76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District
of Philadelphia

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.iUJtrtutt ~ottrt of tqt ~b .;§taftg

'lDuJrington, ~.

"t·

2ll,?J.l.~

CHAM8ERS 01"

April 19, 1977

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 76-37, Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia

Dear Chief:
I agree with your Per Curiam.
Sincerely.

--£111·
•
T.M.
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

(Slip Opinion)
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 76-37
Susan Lynn Vorchheimer, by her parents On Writ of Certiorari to the United
Bert and Carol Vorchheimer,
States Court of
etc., Petitioner,
v.
Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
School District of Philadelphia et al.
[April 19, 1977]
PER CuRIAM.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
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